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I. INTRODUCTION 
A court may certify a class action under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 23 (b )(3) only if it is satisfied, "after a rigorous analysis," 1 
that the plaintiffs have met the Rule 23(a) requirements of 
* Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. The author 
thanks Timothy S. Bishop, Joo Hyang Kim, Nathaniel Persily, and Catherine 
Struve for their comments and assistance in the preparation of this Article. A 
previous version was presented at the 20th Annual Federal Securities Institute 
Conference on February 14, 2002, and benefited from the discussion at that 
session. As an associate with the Chicago office of Mayer, Brown, Rowe & Maw, 
the author participated in the representation of the defendants in Newton v. Merrill 
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001), which is 
discussed infra Part IV. The views expressed in this Article do not necessarily 
reflect those of Mayer Brown. 
1. Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982). 
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numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and also shown 
that " the [common] questions of Jaw or fact . .. predominate over 
any questions affecting individual members and that a class action is 
superior to other available methods for a fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy."2 The text of the Rule might seem 
to erect formidable barriers, but for years it has been received 
wisdom in the legal community that the degree of difficulty in 
getting a class certified depends in large part on the substantive 
theory of recovery. 3 In particular, consensus holds that allegations 
of securities fraud are particularly suitable for class action 
treatment. 4 Basic v. Levinson5 cut the individualized issue of 
reliance out of the Securities and Exchange Commission's standard 
Rule 1 Ob-5 cause of action,6 replacing it with the common issues of 
materiality and market efficiency, and the rest is history. 7 In 
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 8 the Supreme Court notably 
failed to shake up this settled understanding, commenting that 
"[p ]redominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging 
2. FED. R . Crv. P. 23(b)(3). 
3. See U.S.C.S. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 23 note (1998) (History; 
Ancillary Laws and Directives) (outlining causes of action generally thought to 
sustain a class action and those thought to be less certifiable). 
4. !d. 
5. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1987). 
7. Basic endorsed the "fraud-on-the-market" theory, which allowed plaintiffs to 
forego individual proof of reliance on the grounds that they had purchased securities 
on the market "in reliance on the integrity of that price." Basic, 485 U.S. at 247. In 
an efficient market, where "most publicly available information is reflected in 
market price," public misrepresentations will be impounded in the price, and "an 
investor's reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be 
presumed for purposes of a Rule 1 Ob-5 action." !d. Making reliance a common 
issue, rather than an individual one, dramatically alters the Rule 23(b )(3) calculus. 
Plaintiffs typically have great difficulty obtaining class certification for common 
law fraud claims, precisely because the individualized nature of the reliance 
analysis tends to predominate over common issues. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. 
Tobacco Corp., 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A] fraud class action cannot be 
certified when individual reliance will be an issue."). Moreover, the presumed 
effect on the market typically allows plaintiffs to demonstrate the fact of injury by 
common proof-proof that the market price declined after the truth came to light. 
See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 179-80 
(3d Cir. 2001) (stating that investors who trade in a stock affected by fraudulent 
information are presumed injured in fraud-on-the-market cases, but plaintiffs in 
securities class actions can establish loss on a common basis only if the evidence 
indicates that each plaintiff suffered some loss). 
8. 521 U.S. 591 (1997). 
. I 
I 
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consumer or securities fraud. "9 Securities class actions now 
typically follow what one court has called an "all too familiar 
path" : 10 motions practice and discovery "of massive proportions," 11 
followed by settlement on the eve of trial. 12 
How familiar is this pattern? A recent empirical survey of 
class actions in four federal districts over a two-year period found 
that a "(b )(3) class was certified in 94% to 100% of the securities 
cases .... " 13 Such data have caused one commentator to opine that 
the securities class action is no longer best understood as a lawsuit at 
all. 14 Instead, he argues, these suits "have more in common with 
business deals than they do with traditional adversarial litigation," 
and "the attorneys' activities are primarily business-oriented, not 
legal, in nature." 15 
This Article is written in the conviction that things are not 
quite as bad as all that (or quite as good, depending on which side of 
the case caption you are on). In many cases, class certification is not 
a foregone conclusion, and defense counsel would be well advised to 
oppose it vigorously. The purpose of this Article is to explore the 
situations in which such opposition has the best chance of success. 
Part II examines the easiest case for class certification. Part III 
discusses the ways in which allegations of securities fraud may 
depart from that paradigm case. Next, Part IV examines a recent 
decision of the Third Circuit that illustrates the correct approach to 
certification analysis. Finally, Part V sketches the most promising 
arguments with which to oppose motions for class certification in the 
securities fraud context. 
Revisiting these issues is particularly timely given the 1998 
adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(£), which allows, at 
the circuit court's discretion, immediate appeal of class certification 
9. !d. at 625. 
10. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Cal. 1989). 
11. !d.; see also Thomas W. Willging et al., An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 
To Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 74, 91 (1996) (noting 
that "securities complaints contained more frequent use of boilerplate allegations" 
than other Rule 23(b)(3) class action complaints surveyed). 
12. In re Activision Sec. Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 1374. 
13. Willging et al., supra note 11, at 89 (reviewing cases from the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, the Southern District of Florida, the Northern District of 
Illinois, and the Northern District of California). 
14. William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. 
L.J. 371, 372 (2001). 
15. !d. 
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rulings. 16 Prior to the adoption of Rule 23(f), the district court's 
decision on class certification frequently ended the case, one way or 
the other, as a practical matter: the defendants would settle if the 
class was certified, and the plaintiffs would give up if it was not. 17 
\\lith appellate review unavai lable, most of the development of the 
Rule 23(b )(3) standards took place at the district court level. Rule 
23(f) has allowed the appellate courts back into the process, and they 
have given every indication that they intend to take an active role. 
As Judge Easterbrook put it recently, district courts for too long have 
been forced to rely on "only decisions from other district judges, 
most in cases later settled and thus not subject to appellate 
consideration. By granting review now, we can consider whether 
these cases correctly understood the applicable principles." 18 When 
the appellate consideration is over, the conventional wisdom on Rule 
23(b )(3) certifications in securities fraud cases will likely have 
undergone substantial revision, with more rigorous analys is of the 
16. FED. R. Clv. P. 23(f). 
17. Class certification can be a powerful inducement to settlement. With a 
large plaintiff class certified, the magnitude of potential liability can cow even 
defendants who believe the possibility of being held liable is slight. See, e.g., In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1996) (describing 
settlements induced by small probability of immense judgment as "blackmail 
settlements"). Conversely, it has long been recognized that denials of certification 
can sound the death knell for a class action because plaintiffs lack a sufficient stake 
to proceed individually. See generally Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 
463, 470 (1978) (rejecting "death knell" doctrine as basis for appellate jurisdiction). 
As the Advisory Committee Notes indicate, Rule 23(f) was enacted to allow 
appellate review in just such circumstances, and most circuits that have considered 
the issue now hold that practical termination of the case, coupled with a substantial 
question as to the correctness of the certification decision, warrants exercise of 
appellate jurisdiction. See FED. R. Civ . P. 23 advisory committee's note (1998) 
(stating that appeal is appropriate when "as a practical matter, the decision on 
certification is likely dispositive of the litigation"); see also In re Surnitomo Copper 
Litig., 262 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[P]etitioners seeking leave to appeal 
pursuant to Rule 23(f) must demonstrate either (1) that the certification order will 
effectively terminate the litigation and there has been a substantial showing that the 
district court's decision is questionab le, or (2) that the certification order implicates a 
legal question about which there is a compelling need for immediate resolution."); 
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 
2001) (stating that the court should consider the following factors, among others, 
when deciding whether to grant appellate review of a certification order: (1) whether 
the order would have the effect of ending the case; (2) whether the ruling was 
erroneous; and (3) whether an appeal would facilitate the development of the law on 
class certification). 
18. Szabo v. Bridgeport Mach., 249 F.3d 672,675 (7th Cir. 200 1). 
.~, 
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class certification factors becoming the nonn and denial of 
certification in securities cases becoming more commonplace. 19 
II. P AR;\DIGM CASES, OR, vVHA TWAS JUSTICE GINSBURG 
THINKlNG? 
The place to start is with the Supreme Court's aside in 
Amchem, which comes nearest to an authoritative pronouncement on 
the subject. 20 That dictum (the case before the Court was a mass 
tort) seems to neatly encapsulate the conventional wisdom? 1 
However, as the Court was careful to say, its observation applied 
only to certain securities fraud cases, and only to the predominance 
. 27 
reqmrement. -
Amchem certainly does not support the proposition that 
certification is appropriate for all securities fraud cases. 23 However, 
it would be folly to deny that some securities fraud allegations are 
easy cases for class certification. After Basic, there is one prime 
candidate, the paradigm case that presumably informed Justice 
Ginsburg's statement in Amchem. 
The paradigm case involves a single public misrepresentation 
about the underlying value of a security and, a short time thereafter, 
a single public disclosure of the truth. Following the 
misrepresentation, the security's price rises sharply, and after 
disclosure it exhibits an equally sharp correction. Many small 
investors who purchase the security on the open market after the 
misrepresentation and before the corrective disclosure bring suit. 
19. See id. (holding that the cases did not correctly understand the applicable 
principles); see also James D. Weidner, Rule 23(/) Appeals, 1269 PLI/CORP. 717, 
739 (2001) (arguing that because of its "propensity to hear Rule 23(f) appeals," the 
Seventh Circuit "[has] the potential to create a highly developed law on class actions, 
which other courts will then look to for guidance"). The same could now be said of 
the Third Circuit. 
20. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 597 (1997). 
21. !d. at 625 (stating that many mass tort cases would not satisfy the Rule 23 
requirements because as the "Advisory Committee for the 1966 revision of Rule 
23 ... noted ... 'mass accident' cases are likely to present 'significant questions, 
not only of damages but of liability and defenses of liability, ... affecting the 
individuals in different ways'") (omission in original). 
22 . !d. 
23. !d. ("Predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging 
consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitmst laws.") (emphasis 
added). 
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The requirements of Rule 23 fit those facts like a glove.24 
The plaintiffs are all in essentially the same position: they purchased 
securities whose market prices were inflated, to an identical extent, 
by a single misrepresentation (commonality). Each plaintiff, in an 
individual suit, would be seeking to prove facts that would entitle the 
others to recover (typicality and adequacy). The common issues 
would encompass almost all the elements of the Rule 1 Ob-5 cause of 
action-materiality, scienter, causation, and injury, with materiality 
doing double-duty as reliance under Basic-and would predominate 
over whatever individual issues exist. 25 Finally, because small 
investors with little at stake might not be able to attract plainti±Is' 
lawyers if forced to proceed individually, the superiority of the class 
action form is evident. 
However, the fact that a particular, idealized securities fraud 
case is suitable for class treatment does not mean that all, or even 
most, are. The hold that this paradigm case exerts over the legal 
imagination is regrettable, because many securities fraud cases differ 
in crucial respects. They do not involve single misrepresentations or 
disclosures, and sometimes the representations do not relate to the 
underlying value of a security. They feature long time periods and 
ambiguous price movements, and the purchasers include large 
institutions as well as small investors. The following Part discusses 
the ways in which the facts of securities fraud cases may depart from 
the paradigm sketched above and the implications of those 
departures for the certification requirements. 
Ill. PARADIGMS LOST: COMPLICATIONS 
Actual allegations of securities fraud may differ from the 
paradigm case in several ways, complicating matters for plaintiffs 
seeking class certification. 
A. Long Class Periods 
As class periods grow longer, the efficacy of a plaintiffs 
invocation of the fraud-on-the-market theory decreases. In the Rule 
1 Ob-5 context, the theory essentially works by substituting a 
24. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes. 
25. !d. 
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materiality analysis for what would otherwise be an individualized 
inquiry into reliance: if the misrepresentation was materi al, then it 
affected the market price, and plaintiffs relying on the integrity of the 
market price may be deemed to have relied on the 
misrepresentation?6 It is impmiant to realize, however, that the 
commonality thus created exists only for plaintiffs purchasing at the 
same time. vVhether a misrepresentation is material depends on how 
it affects the "total mix" of information available to an investor;27 as 
the total mix of information changes over time, so too does the 
materi ality analysis. Publicly-held corporations issue earnings 
statements and press releases; they file SEC disclosure forms and are 
the subject of analyst reports. Information about the economy in 
general, or the prospects of an industry or sector, also affects a 
company's value. Because the total mix of information available is 
constantly changing, it will frequently be impossible to establish 
materiality by common proof. A misrepresentation that was material 
when made may soon become immaterial as it is overtaken by a 
welter of new information coming to the marketplace.28 
B. lvfultiple Misrepresentations or Disclosures 
In particular, as class periods grow longer, the chances 
increase that the case will feature either multiple misrepresentations 
or multiple corrective disclosures. Multiple misrepresentations or 
disclosures not only complicate the materiality and reliance analyses, 
as discussed above; they also create the potential for conflicts 
between class members. Each plaintiff can maximize his recovery 
by showing that the price of the security was inflated when he 
purchased it, but not when he sold it.29 Because class members buy 
and sell from each other, they will have opposite incentives with 
regard to proof of price inflation; each will want to stress the 
26. See, e.g., Mottoros v. Abrams, 524 F.Supp. 254, 258 (D.C. Ill. 1981). 
27 . See TSC Indus., Inc v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976). 
28 . See, e.g., J.H. Cohn & Co. v. Am. Appraisal Assocs. , Inc., 628 F.2d 994, 
998 (7th Cir. 1980) (stating that an early purchaser "would face a different question 
of proof on the materiality issue" than one who purchased "after a great deal more 
information ... was available"); Gelman v. Westinghouse Corp., 73 F.R.D. 60, 68 
(W.D. Pa. 1976) ("[T]he question of materiality as it pertains to the claim of a 
shareholder who sold stock in May or June is vastly different from the question as it 
pertains to claims stemming from sales in November or December."), aff'd, 612 F.2d 
799 (3d Cir. 1980). 
29. See, e.g., Greene v. Emersons Ltd., 86 F.R.D. 47, 61-62 (D.C.N.Y. 1980). 
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importance of misrepresentations occurring before his purchase and 
of disclosures occurring before his sale while downplaying the 
significance of others. This conflict threatens the adequacy of any 
single class representative. 30 The existence of multiple 
misrepresentations or disclosures also dramatically increases the 
magnitude and complexity of the proceedings necessary to establish 
materiality and loss causation and to calculate damages. 31 
C. Atypical or Nonpublic Misrepresentations 
In some cases, the misrepresentations on which plaintiffs 
base their Rule 1 Ob-5 claim will either not relate directly to the value 
of the underlying security or will be made to individual investors 
rather than disseminated to the public. 32 Either of these features can 
prevent plaintiffs from using the fraud-on-the-market theory to 
establish materiality, reliance, or fact of injury. Plaintiffs who 
cannot rely on the fraud-on-the-market theory face an uphill battle in 
seeking certification. There are few other ways to establish these 
elements by common proof, and the need for individualized analysis 
of even one element of the cause of action may preclude a finding of 
predominance or make a trial unmanageable. 33 
----- --------------------------
30. See, e.g., Ziemack v. Centel Corp., 163 F.R.D. 530, 540-42 (N.D. Ill. 1995) 
(discussing conflict between securities fraud class members who bought and sold at 
different times); In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1358-62 
(N.D. Cal. 1994) (examining conflicts in litigation between those that bought and 
sold on different days and those that still hold some of the relevant securities); Ballan 
v. Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473, 482-85 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (discussing "the conflict 
between sellers and purchasers of the subclass periods"). See generally David J. 
Ross, Do Conflicts Between Class Members Vitiate Class Action Securities Fraud 
Suits?, 70 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 209 (1996) (discussing both "seller-purchaser conflict" 
and "equity conflict"). 
31. See, e.g., In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 1341, 1358-59 
(N.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that because antagonism over price inflation, for 
example, implicates the damages, reliance, materiality, and proximate cause 
elements, it is "heart of the suit"). 
32. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that fraud-on-the-market doctrine and its presumption of reliance upon 
misstatements were inapplicable in a securities fraud class action against securities 
brokerage firm for stockbroker's allegedly false statements to several clients that a 
particular corporation was certain to be acquired at premium in near future). 
3 3. As discussed in greater detail in Part III, the a typicality of the alleged 
misrepresentation was enough to preclude certification in Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 179-80 (3d Cir. 2001). See also, e.g., 
Prudential, 282 F.3d at 938 (refusing to allow plaintiffs to invoke fraud-on-the-
,,. 
! 
' 
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D. Differences Among Investors 
While the paradigm case assumes a large number of 
homogenous small investors, the truth is that large institutional 
investors own a substantial and increasing percentage of securities. 
Sixty years ago, Harry Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield argued for 
the appropriateness of class actions in cases in which many 
individuals have "a small stake in a large controversy" and might be 
unwilling to proceed on an individual basis. 34 That may once have 
been an apt description of securities fraud cases; in 1950, 
institutional investors held only 7.2% of outstanding e~uities. 35 
However, by 1997 that proportion had increased to 46.7%. 3 Many, 
if not most, securities fraud cases now count large institutions, with 
large holdings of the stock at issue, among the potential plaintiffs-
institutions such as mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds, and 
large corporations with the resources and economic incentives to 
pursue individual claims.37 
The presence of institutional investors not only undermines 
one of the policy bases for class treatment, it also destroys the 
uniformity among plaintiffs presumed by the paradigm case. 
Institutional investors are more sophisticated than the average 
market based on nonpublic misrepresentations); In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 
F.3d 136, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2001) (fmding no predominance in fraud case based on 
numerous non-uniform "sales pitches" for annuity contracts); Baum v. Great W. 
Cities, Inc., of N.M., 703 F.2d 1197, 1210 (lOth Cir. 1983) (affmning the district 
court's ruling not to certify the case as a class action because individual issues of 
reliance and limitations might prevent common issues from predominating); Simon 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(stating that a class should not be certified when individual problems predominate 
over questions of law and fact common to all). 
34. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of 
the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 684 ( 1941 ). 
35. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, 2001 FACT BOOK 61-62, available at 
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/200 1_ factbook _ 06.pdf. 
36. /d. 
37. See Dan Cordtz, Private Attorney General, PALM BEACH DAILY Bus. 
REv., Sept. 10, 2001, at 8 (stating that institutional investors like pension funds are 
increasingly taking the lead in securities class action certifications); see also Paul 
Elias, Locals Lose Out in McKesson Case, SAN FRANCISCO RECORDER, Dec. 30, 
1999, at 1 (noting the choice of the New York State Common Retirement Fund to 
serve as lead plaintiff in stock fraud suit); Michael A. Riccardi, Judge Calls for 
Competitive Bids to Hire Securities Counsel, Legal Intelligencer, Aug. 5, 1998, at 
1 (reporting four large pension funds selection to be co-lead plaintiffs in a 
securities fraud class action). 
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individual investor, and differing sophistication may destroy 
commonality on several Rule 1 Ob-5 issues. The materiality analysis 
depends on the sophistication of a plainti±T,38 as does the assessment 
of reasonable reliance39 and the application of the Securities Act's 
tolling provision.40 The presence of institutional investors within the 
plaintiff class will prevent resolution of these issues by common 
proof and undermine the predominance of common issues. 
Another distinct class of investors is short sellers, who sell 
shares of stock they do not own in anticipation that the price will 
decline. 41 Short sellers may fall within a class definition based on 
sale, or even one based on purchase, as they buy stock to cover their 
short positions. 42 However, to say that a short seller relies on the 
integrity of the market price is a stretch; traders short-sell stocks 
precisely because they believe the market overestimates their true 
value. More significantly, a trader who knew that a 
misrepresentation was inflating a security's price would be more (not 
less) likely to execute his short sale, so proving transaction causation 
is all but impossible. Finally, short sellers are unlikely to have been 
injured. Inclusion of short sellers in a class can thus prevent 
plaintiffs from establishing materiality, reliance, or fact of injury 
with common proof, threatening predominance.43 
38. See Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976) 
(fmding no materiality when a plaintiff acting with "due care" should have known 
the relevant facts, taking into account the plaintiff's "sophistication" and "access to 
the relevant information"). 
39. See Brown v. E.F. Hutton, 991 F.2d 1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that 
when an investor acts recklessly there is not justifiable reliance). 
40. Securities Act of 1933 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994 & West Supp. 2002). 
See Romano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 834 F.2d 523, 528 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (acknowledging that the two-year statute oflirnitations does not begin to 
run until "the aggrieved party has either actual knowledge of the violation or 
notice of facts which, in the exercise of due diligence, would have led to actual 
knowledge thereof'). 
41. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1379 (6th ed. 1990) (defming "short 
sale"). 
42. See Sullivan & Long, Inc. v. Scattered Corp., 47 F.3d 857, 859 (7th Cir. 
1995) ( defming a "short sale" to be a "sale at a price fixed now for delivery later"). 
43. See Ganesh v. Computer Learning Ctrs., Inc., 183 F.R.D. 487, 490 (E.D. 
Va. 1998) ("Short-sellers arguably lack standing to avail themselves of the 
securities laws, both because they effectively sold their stock before they 
purchased it and because, unlike the traditional investor who hopes to profit from 
the company's good fortune, they seek to gain from the company's decline.") . 
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E. Frankenstein 's 1\fonsters 
As the facts of a securities fraud case depart from the 
certification paradigm, it becomes less possible to establish the 
elements of the claim by common proof. This makes it more likely, 
from the Rule 23(b)(3) perspective, that individual issues will be 
found to predominate.44 However, it has additional legal 
significance, especially in the larger cases, for the superiority 
requirement. 
Rule 23(b )(3) requires a would-be class representative to 
show "that a class action is superior to other available methods for 
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy," and the rule 
explicitly instructs courts to consider "the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of a class action."45 These 
difficulties are seldom faced because of the frequency with which 
securities fraud class actions are settled before trial. However, the 
fact that a case is likely to be settled if a class is certified46 does not 
mean that the difficulties of trying the case can be ignored in the 
certification calculus (unless, of course, the class presented for 
certification is a settlement class), as the Supreme Court made clear 
. A h 47 m me em. 
Consequently, departures from the paradigm case can take on 
an added significance. Even if they are insufficient to lead the court 
to conclude that common issues predominate, the practical burdens 
of performing even a brief individualized analysis for every member 
of a large class may overwhelm the trial system's resources. As the 
Ninth Circuit stated, "[I]t cannot be lightly overlooked that as a class 
gets larger it may transform a litigation into a gigantic burden on the 
44. FED. R. CIV. P . 23(b)(3). 
45 . !d. 
46. See supra note 17. That a large class has substantial in terrorem potential is 
not an unmitigated good for plaintiffs. Federal courts are growing more sensitive to 
the coercive aspects of certification and may be less likely to certify a class that 
threatens such massive liability as to make a metits defense unthinkable. See 
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc ., 259 F.3d 154, 167 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2001) ("[T]he size of the class and number of claims may place acute and 
unwarranted pressure on defendants to settle. It is a factor we weigh m our 
certification calculus."). 
47. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) 
("Confronted with a request for settlement-only class certification, a district court 
need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management 
problems."). Moreover, the more coercive the certification, the greater the likelihood 
ofRule 23(f) review. FED. R. CN. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1998). 
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Court's resources beyond its capacity to manage or effectively 
control."48 For very large classes, the demands of an actual trial can 
approach the absurd. In one case, the court estimated that actual trial 
of individual damage claims would require "well over one hundred 
years."49 At that point, the class action can no longer be called a 
superior form of resolution, and the case becomes what the Supreme 
Court has described as a "Frankenstein monster posing as a class 
. ,,so actwn.-
F. Non-JOb-5 Claims 
While the general proscription of Rule 1 Ob-5 dominates the 
popular imagination, securities fraud plaintiffs may also bring suit 
under other sections of the Act, notably Sections 11 and 12(a)(2).51 
In addition to the complications discussed above, these sections 
present their own difficulties for a plaintiff seeking class 
certification. 
Section 11 imposes liability on certain enumerated parties for 
misstatements or omissions in registration statements.52 It requires 
plaintiffs to make two showings that frequently cannot be achieved 
with common proof. First, while there is currently a split of 
authority over whether its cause of action extends to plaintiffs who 
purchased in the secondary market rather than in an initial public 
offering, 53 it is agreed that plaintiffs must in any case be able to show 
that the stock they purchased was issued pursuant to the allegedly 
48. In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 91 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting Morris 
v. Burchard, 51 F.R.D. 530, 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)). 
49. Galloway v. Am. Brands, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 580, 586 (E.D.N.C. 1978). The 
claims in Galloway were antitrust claims, but similar principles govern securities 
fraud cases. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 827 F.2d 718, 725 (11th 
Cir. 1987) (fmding that a large class was appropriate in a securities fraud action only 
because the common questions predominated need for individual treatments) . Also, 
damage is an element of the 1 Ob-5 cause of action, just as it is with the Sherman Act. 
In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 81-88 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000). 
50. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 169 (1974). 
51. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 11, 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C . 77k, 77l(a)(2) (1994 & 
West Supp. 2002). 
52. 15 U.S.C. § 77k. 
53. Compare WRT Energy Sec. Litig., 1997 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) '1[ 99,560 
(S .D.N.Y. 1997) (allowing suit only by initial public offering purchasers), with 
Joseph v. Wiles, 223 F.3d 1155, 1161 (lOth Cir. 2000) (allowing suit by aftermarket 
purchasers). 
1 
j 
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defective registration statement.54 Second, while Section 11 does not 
generally require a plaintiff to show reliance, it does impose a 
reliance requirement on any plaintiff who purchases the security 
after the issuer has made available an earnings statement covering a 
period of twelve months after the registration statement. 55 
Section 12(a)(2) allows purchasers of securities sold on the 
basis of a false or misleading prospectus, or false or misleading oral 
statements, to sue their sellers.56 It applies only to purchasers in 
initial public offerings. 57 Section 12(a)(2), like Section 11 , grants 
defendants affirmative defenses that may require individual 
analysis. 58 First, both sections allow defendants to avoid or reduce 
liability by showing that all or part of the decline in the value of a 
security is due to factors other than the alleged misrepresentation or 
omission.59 Second, both sections preclude recovery by any person 
who actually knew of the alleged misrepresentation at the time of 
purchase.6° Finally, both sections are subject to the general Section 
13 limitations period, which may require individualized assessments 
of diligence. 61 In addition, the equitable basis of the Section 12(a)(2) 
rescission remedy has led courts to impose a promptness requirement 
akin to a laches defense. 62 However, the "class action format is not 
suitable for the individualized treatment required for the exercise of 
. bl ,63 eqmta e powers. 
G. Atypical Lead Plaintiffs 
Defeating certification by showing the atypicality of a named 
plaintiff is usually only a temporary victory, as the class may just 
54. See Barnes v. Osofsky, 373 F.2d 269, 271-73 (2d Cir. 1967) (approving an 
action maintained only by one who purchased the securities directly subject to the 
registration statement). 
55. 15 U.S .C. § 77k. 
56. 15 U.S .C. § 77/(a)(2). 
57. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 582-84 (1995) (stating that 
claims may only arise out of initial sale offerings and not private sale agreements). 
58. 15 U.S.C. § 77/(b). 
59. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(e), 77/(b). 
60. 15 U.S.C. § 77/(a)(2). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1994 & West Supp. 2002). 
62. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. '21' Int'l Holdings, Inc. , 821 F. 
Supp. 212, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[P]Iaintiffs must make a prompt demand for 
rescission in order to ... obtain ... damages under§ 12(2)."). 
63. McDonald v. Pension Plan of NYSA-ILA Pension Trus t Fund, 153 F. 
Supp. 2d 268, 298-99 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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return with another representative. 64 Nonetheless, it is worth 
considering, because a typicality challenge may fare well against 
"professional plaintiffs." A plaintiff who has purchased stock simply 
to bring a lawsuit demonstrably did not rely on the integrity of the 
market price and thus is subject to a defense not applicable to the rest 
of the class, a disqualifying atypicality. 65 
IV. APPLICATIONS: NEWTON V.lv!ERRILL LYNCH, PIERCE, FENNER 
& SMITH, INC. 66 
In Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 
("Newton IF'), the Third Circuit encountered a putative class action 
that differed significantly from the paradigm case. 67 The named 
plaintiff sought to represent a class of investors who purchased and 
sold securities on the NASDAQ market between November 4, 1992 
and August 28, 1996.68 The defendants were the broker-dealers who 
had executed the plaintiffs' orders. The theory of liability was that 
the broker-dealers had violated their duty of best execution by 
executing the investors' orders at the price offered by the National 
Best Bid and Offer system (NBBO) without consulting alternative 
sources of liquidity such as SelectNet or Instinet (private on-line 
services). 69 Failure to disclose the alleged breach of duty leveraged 
the common law tort into a Rule lOb-5 claim.70 
64. See, e.g. , Alinda v. Penton Media, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 363, 365 
(S.D .N.T. 2001) (stating that Congress did not intend to "preclude intervention and 
certification of non-leading plaintiffs when previously appointed lead plaintiffs 
have been disqualified"). 
65. See Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) 
("(C]lass certification should not be granted if 'there is a danger that absent class 
members will suffer if their representative is preoccupied with defenses unique to 
it.'") (quoting Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc. , 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990). 
66 . 259 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Newton If'). 
67 . !d. at 162. 
68. !d. at 169. 
69 . !d. at 162. For a detailed description of these alternative sources, see the 
district court opinion granting summary judgment to defendants. In re Merrill 
Lynch Sec. Litig., 911 F. Supp. 754,759-60 (D.N.J. 1995), rev'd en bane, Newton 
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. 135 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("Newton F'). 
70. See In re Merrill Lynch Sec. Litig., 911 F. Supp. at 768 ("(T]he Federal 
securities statutes were modeled after the common law actions of fraud and 
deceit."). 
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The defendants initially prevailed before the district court on 
the theory that the duty of best execution was not sufficiently well-
defined during the class period for the plaintiffs to establish either 
materiality or scienter. 71 A divided panel of the Third Circuit 
affirmed, but the court en bane reversed, holding that when better 
prices were reasonably available, NBBO execution might be a 
breach of the duty of best execution, and failure to disclose the 
practice of not consulting alternate sources might be a Rule 1 Ob-5 
. 1 . 72 v1o atlon. 
That clarification of the potential liability set the stage for the 
district court's class certification decision. The defendants had, 
according to the complaint, engaged in a uniform course of conduct 
that might in some circumstances amount to a violation of Rule 1 Ob-
5. Was that common conduct enough to support certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3)? Judge Debevoise answered in the negative and the 
plaintiffs appealed. 73 
The plaintiffs ' central theme on appeal was the defendants' 
common conduct. Every proposed class member, they argued, had 
been treated identically, and this "common scheme" made class 
treatment appropriate. 74 Not so, the defendants replied: Determining 
whether a better price was available for any particular trade, and 
whether that plaintiff would have wanted a broker-dealer to spend 
the time to look for it, would require consideration of the particular 
circumstances of every plaintiffs every trade-individualized issues 
that would predominate over common ones and overwhelm any 
court' s factfinding ability.75 
The facts of Newton parted company with the paradigm case 
on one central point. The alleged misrepresentations or omissions 
had no connection to the underlying value of any security, relating 
instead to the manner in which orders were executed.76 The Third 
Circuit began its analysis with this observation77 and went on to 
71. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 171. 
72. See id. (discussing en bane holding). 
73. !d. 
74. See id. ("[Plaintiffs] claim this 'common scheme' provides a uniform 
course of unlawful conduct well-suited for adjudication as a class action."). 
75. See id. at 172 (detailing defendants' argument against class certification). 
76. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 173. 
77. See id. ("It is important to recognize that the facts of this case do not 
resonate with those typical of securities violations under Rule 10b-5. Customarily 
those claims involve a fraudulent material misrepresentation or omission that affects 
a security's value."). 
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demonstrate how one divergence from the paradigm may be enough 
b .fi . 78 to ar certl 1catwn. 
The defendants argued that each of the elements of a 1 Ob-5 
cause of action would require individualized analysis. 79 The Third 
Circuit found the materiality issue decided by its en bane holding 
that a broker-dealer who accepted a customer's order "while 
intending to breach that duty [of best execution] makes a 
misrepresentation that is material."80 With respect to reliance, it 
found that the atypical nature of the misrepresentations (their lack of 
connection to the underlying value of any security) prevented th e 
plaintiffs from using the fraud-on-the-market theory to create a 
presumption of reliance. 81 As a consolation prize, the court gave the 
plaintiffs a rebuttable presumption of reliance under Affiliated Ute 
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 82 which allows such a presumption 
with regard to omissions on the grounds that it is unfair to require a 
plaintiff to prove reliance on an omission. 83 The Affiliated Ute 
presumption is a poor substitute for fraud-on-the-market, however, 
since the defendant's ability to rebut on a plaintiff-by-plain tiff basis 
tends to shift reliance out of the "common" column and into the 
"individual."84 With respect to the fact of injury, the unavailability 
of the fraud-on-the-market theory likewise prevented plaintiffs from 
78. See id. at 182-83 (discussing the commonality requirement for class 
certification). 
79. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 
269 (3d Cir. 1998) ("Newton f'). 
80. !d. This analysis of the materiality issue seems obvious-an intent to 
breach the duty of best execution certainly sounds material- but on the facts of 
Newton it is questionable. The form the alleged breach took was automatic NBBO 
execution, and some investors (those who anticipated a rapid price increase) 
presumably would have preferred the speed of that execution to the delay required to 
scour the Internet for alternate sources of liquidity. Newton If, 259 F.3d at 176-78. 
Moreover, some of the plaintiffs were sophisticated institutional investors who were 
quite aware ofboth the defendants' practice ofNBBO execution and the existence of 
alternatives. !d. 
81. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 175-76. 
82. 406 U.S. 128 (1970). 
83. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 174-75 (discussing the "most reasonable 
placement of the burden of proof of reliance"). 
84. See id. at 176-80 (discussing the possible unavailability of a presumption of 
reliance). In Newton II, that rebuttal would have taken the form of showing that a 
particular plaintiff either valued speed of execution over the potential for lower 
prices, or was indifferent, or that the plaintiff knew of defendants ' practice and the 
possible alternatives-precisely the same possibilities the cowi erroneously ignored 
in supposing that materiality presented a cornn1on issue. 
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establishing this element via common proof 85 \tVhether an investor 
had suffered the injury necessary for a Rule 1 Ob-5 claim depended 
on whether a better alternative price was in fac t available and 
whether the investor would have wanted his broker to spend the time 
needed to look for it. 86 These requirements obviously raised 
individualized questions. 87 
With fact of injury requiring a trade-by-trade analysis and 
reliance subject to plaintiff-by-plaintiff rebuttal,88 the court found 
that individual issues predominated, plaintiffs' invocation of the 
Arnchem dictum notwithstanding. 89 The need to " [ e ]xamin[ e] 
millions of trades to ascertain whether or not there was injury ... 
h 1 d t
. ,90 overw e me common ques wns .... 
The plaintiffs proposed to "gloss over this requirement" by 
developing a statistical formula that would calculate aggregate 
damages and then allocate them among class members. 9 1 Such a 
suggestion, the court observed, would allow the plaintiffs to 
substitute a statistical calculation of damages for the proof of 
individual injury that the Rule 1 Ob-5 cause of action requires. 92 That 
suggestion would allow plaintiffs to dispense with proof of one 
element of their claim, a substantive alteration of rights forbidden by 
the Rules Enabling Act. 93 
Predominance aside, the court also found that determining 
whether each plaintiff had been injured and evaluating the individual 
defenses that could be raised was simply too massive and complex a 
task. 94 Trial of the proposed class would require examination of 
"hundreds of millions of transactions executed over several years"; it 
would simply be unmanageable, indeed flatly impossible, without a 
lot of impermissible shortcuts.95 
85. !d. at 179-80. 
86. !d. at 178. 
87. See id. at 177-81. 
88. Newton II, 259 F.3d at 181. 
89. See id. at 189 (noting plaintiffs' citation of Amchem). 
90. !d. at 187. 
91. !d. at 187-88. 
92. See id. at 187-90 (asserting that damage calculations do not exempt plaintiff 
from proving injury). 
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000) (stating that rules "shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right"). 
94. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192 (" [E]stablishing proof of plaintiffs ' 
injuries and litigating the defenses available to defendants would present 
insurmountable manageability problems for the district court."). 
95. See id. at 191-92. 
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Newton 11 holds important lessons for securities fraud defense 
counsel with regard to both of the grounds on which it was decided. 
Its predominance analysis demonstrates that when the effect of a 
common course of conduct depends on characteristics of the 
individual plaintiff or the individual transaction, the mere fact of 
common conduct is not enough.96 Securities fraud or not, the alleged 
offense becomes conceptually similar to a mass tmi, and class 
certification is inappropriate for the same reasons that apply to mass 
torts. 97 Newton IFs superiority analysis shows that as a proposed 
class grows larger, it becomes more vulnerabl e to manageability 
challenges. 98 Even if injury could have been presumed, the task of 
calculating damages for each plaintiff "would require hundreds of 
millions of individual assessments,"99 something no court could 
do. 100 Even a single individualized inquiry may thus be enough to 
bring down a truly massive class; as the Fourth Circuit has put it, 
"where the issue of damages and impact does not lend itself to ... a 
mechanical calculation, but requires ' separate mini-trial[s]' of an 
overwhelming[ly] large number of individual claims, courts have 
found that the 'staggering problems of logistics ' thus created 'make 
96. See id. at 189 (observing "the huge number of important individualized 
issues" that overwhelm any common questions). 
97. !d. at 189-90 (noting similarity to mass tort cases). 
98. See id. at 192 (explaining that the surperiority requirement casts "serious 
doubt" on the manageability of certifying the class for trial). 
99 . Newton II, 259 F.3d at 192. 
100. Bifurcating the trial into a liability phase and a damages phase is often 
suggested as a solution to the problem of calculating damages. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 58 (1991). Bifurcation can raise serious 
constitutional issues, however, because liability and damages issues often intertwine. 
See, e.g., In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1114, 1182 
(stating that "Seventh Amendment problems are inherent when separate juries 
determine facts of damage and amount of damages"). Therefore, the Seventh 
Amendment, which forbids one jury from reviewing another's conclusions, is 
implicated. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co. , 84 F.3d 734, 750-51 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (citing bifurcation as a factor weighing heavily against certification where 
individual issues, such as comparative negligence, were intertwined with common 
issues). The danger is especially acute with regard to claims (like those under Rule 
10b-5) for which actual injury is an element of the cause of action. Any damages-
phase jury determination that a plaintiff's damages are zero will contradict the 
liability-phase fmding of injury. See In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust 
Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1184 (3d Cir. 1993) (reversing damages verdict handed down 
following a bifurcated antitrust trial because the jury may have reconsidered fact of 
injury in determining amount of damages). 
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the damage aspect of [the J case predominate,' and render the case 
bl 1 t
. ,10 1 
unmanagea e as a c ass ac 10n. 
Newton II also provides a useful reminder that plaintiffs 
cannot make it past the certification stage merely by invoking the 
authority of an expert. 102 To overcome the di ffi culties inherent in 
examining each and every trade to determine whether individual 
plaintiffs suffered injury, the plaintiffs offered their expert's 
assertion that "a reliable measure of damages can be developed in 
this case based on the application of well-established statistical 
techniques." 103 The Third Circuit correctly refused to accept the 
offer: the proposed statistical proof would not have proved that each 
plaintiff had in fact suffered an actual injury, and what the plaintiffs 
proposed was essentially to overcome the predominance problem by 
eliding an element of the Rule 1 Ob-5 cause of action.104 
From one perspective, the Third Circuit's treatment of the 
proffered statistical analysis is easily recognizable as conventional 
Rule 23(b) predominance analysis. The defendants claimed that the 
fact of injury would require individualized analysis, and the plaintiffs 
failed to establish that they could demonstrate injury by common 
proof. 105 From another perspective, however, it appears to venture 
into the merits of the case. The plaintiffs offered expert testimony to 
prove both fact and amount of damages, and the court held that 
testimony insufficient. 106 Yet it is one of the most familiar 
aphorisms of class action law that "nothing in either the language or 
the history of Rule 23 ... gives a court any authority to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine 
whether it may be maintained as a class action."107 
The fact that an analysis of plaintiffs' ability to satisfy the 
demands of Rule 23(b)(3) with expert testimony may resemble an 
inquiry into the merits of the case has caused courts some difficulty. 
101. Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc ., 565 F.2d 59, 68 (4th Cir. 1977). Also 
encouraging for defense counsel is the recognition of the Newton II court that 
certification of an unusually large class "would place hydraulic pressure on 
defendants to settle which weighs in the superiority analysis." Newton II, 259 F.3d 
at 192. This suggests that large classes may, apart from other defects, sometimes 
simply fall of their own weight. 
102. See Newton II, 259 F.3d at 182 (listing requirements for certification) . 
103. !d. at 188 n.33. 
104. See id. at 187-90. 
105. Id. at 188-89. 
106. !d. at 188. 
107. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974). 
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In its In re Visa Check/lv!as termoney Antitrust Litigation 108 opinion, 
the Second Circuit, over a strong dissent, invoked the Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin 109 principle in support of a very limited role for 
courts in assessing expert testimony at the certification stage: "a 
district court may not weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in 
' statistical dueling ' of experts." 110 This statement is correct in a 
certain limited sense. A court should not refuse to certify a class 
simply because it believes that the plaintiffs will not be able to make 
good on the factual allegations in their complaint, and to this extent 
merits questions are irrelevant to the certification decision. 111 
However, it is simply not true that a district court is barred from 
weighing evidence or assessing competing testimony when doing so 
is necessary to a Rule 23 analysis. 112 ·w hat Eisen forbids is a 
"preliminary inquiry into the merits," not the resolution of a merits 
issue in the course of a certification decision. 113 The In re Visa 
Check/Mastermoney court may have confused these two concepts. 
As Judge Jacobs pointed out in his dissent, the challenged expert 
testimony related to the measure of damages, and the determination 
of which measure of damages should apply was "critical to the class 
certification motion" because one of the candidates created 
"intractable conflict" between class members. 114 
Like the Newton II court, the Seventh Circuit recently 
recognized that the analysis prescribed by Rule 23 must be 
scrupulously performed, even if it overlaps with the merits. In West 
v. Prudential Securities, Inc., 115 it refused to allow certification 
based on uncritical acceptance of an expert's testimony, holding that 
such deferential treatment "amounts to a delegation of judicial power 
to the plaintiffs, who can obtain class certification just by hiring a 
competent expert."116 The Prudential plaintiffs sought to use the 
fraud-on-the-market theory to allow all purchasers of a particular 
stock to recover for alleged misstatements that were made by a 
single broker to a small number of clients, and never publicly 
108. 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2001). 
109. 417 U.S. 156 (1974) . 
110. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney, 280 F.3d at 135. 
111. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177. 
112. !d.; West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002). 
113. Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177. 
114. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney, 280 F.3d at 155, 158 (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting). 
115. West v. Prudential Sec., Inc ., 282 F.3d 935 (7th Cir. 2002) 
116. !d. at 938. 
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disseminated. 11 7 A "reputable financial economist" provided expert 
support for the plaintiffs' theory, and the district court certified the 
class. 118 The Seventh Circuit reversed, 11 9 holding that the 
application of the fraud-on-the-market theory to nonpublic 
misrepresentations was a significant extension, and the fact that 
plaintiffs produced competent expert testimony as some suppmi for 
their theory was not enough to satisfy the demands of Rule 23. 120 
Engaging in an independent review of the record, Judge Easterbrook 
held that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that nonpublic 
information affected the price of the stock at issue, a fatal defect. 121 
Like Newton II, Prudential is, from one perspective, a 
conventional certification decision. The plaintiffs failed to show that 
they could establish causation by common proof. 122 Of course, 
Judge Easterbrook's decision on that point was bound up with the 
merits; the plaintiffs failed because their evidence did not 
demonstrate causation at all, even though their expert opined that it 
did. 123 Prudential and Newton II conectly recognize that plaintiffs 
cannot insulate a certification motion from scrutiny by wrapping it in 
expert testimony. 124 Critical evaluation of an expert's opinion as to 
what conclusions the evidence supports will frequently bring courts 
close upon the merits, but it is no more than Rule 23 demands. 125 An 
expert who testifies, for example, that every plaintiff has suffered 
injury is in effect testifying that injury may be established by 
common proof. However, the decision as to whether the elements of 
a claim are susceptible to common proof is for the judge and may not 
be handed off to experts. "A district judge may not," as Judge 
Easterbrook held, "duck hard questions by observing that each side 
has some support, or that considerations relevant to class 
certification also may affect the decision on the merits. Tough 
117. Id. at 936-37 . 
118 . !d. at 938 . 
119. Id.at940. 
120. Prudential, 282 F.3d at 937. 
121. !d. at 938-39. 
122. !d. at 938. 
123. !d. 
124. !d.; Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 
154, 191 (3d Cir. 2001) ("Newton IF'). 
125. See, e.g. , Weisfeld v. Sun Chemical Corp., 210 F.R.D. 136, 143-44 
(D.N.J. 2002) (concluding that plaintiffs expert witness could only show that the 
antitrust injury impacted the class members and did not fulfill the requirement of 
common proo( thereby fa iling to meet the requirements of Rule 23). 
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questions must be faced and squarely decided, if necessary by 
holding evidentiary hearings and choosing between competing 
perspectives."126 Rule 23 demands a rigorous analysis, and expert 
testimony is no substitute for judicial decision-making. 
V. ARGUMENTS AND AUTHORITY 
The previous Parts have given an abstract description of 
difficulties for securities fraud class action plaintiffs and have 
examined a case study. This Part aims to offer resources for 
defendants. Following are the most powerful arguments against 
certification and citations to the most useful cases in support of those 
arguments. The arguments and citations are grouped according to 
the requirements of Rule 23. 
A. Typicality 
A named plaintiff will fail to satisfy the typicality 
requirement if he himself has no claim. 127 In Baffa v. Donaldson, 
Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corp., 128 for example, the Second 
126. Prudential, 282 F.3d at 938. One way of putting this is to say that class 
certification is not summary judgment. A plaintiff can survive a summary 
judgment motion merely by demonstrating contested issues of fact; the judge must 
deny the motion even if he is skeptical about the plaintiffs ability ultimately to 
prove his case. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675-76 (7th 
Cir. 2001) (noting that a decision to certify under Rule 23 does not involve 
accepting the plaintiffs' assertions as true, but that instead a judge must make 
whatever factual or legal inquiries are necessary to allow the class action to 
proceed). However, Rule 23 forbids agnosticism; it does not allow class 
certification in the face of doubt as to whether the plaintiffs have made the 
required showing. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) (explaining that the court must find 
that "the questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members" before a class action will be maintained). Hence, is it not 
enough (as the In re Visa Check/Mastermoney court apparently believed) for 
plaintiffs to show '"a reasonable probability of establishing' [their] claims by 
common proof'? In re Visa Check!Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 
135 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 91 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998)). The court must face the issue and decide whether common 
proof is possible. 
127. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(3) (discussing that one or more members of a 
class may sue or be sued on behalf of all only if "the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the claims and defenses of the class"). 
128. 222 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2000). 
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Circuit affirmed the distri ct court ' s denial of certification on the 
grounds that the plaintiffs lack of standing made him "an atypical 
and inadequate representative." 129 Such plaintiffs apparently present 
themselves with some frequency. 130 More commonly, however, the 
named plaintiff will simply be subject to unique defenses that might 
distract from the common issues. As the Seventh Circuit put it, "The 
presence of even an arguable defense peculiar to the named plaintiff 
or a small subset of the plaintiff class may destroy the required 
. 1. f h 1 " 13 1 typ1ca 1ty o t e c ass . 
B. Adequacy 
An adequacy challenge usually asserts that the interests of 
class members are antagonistic. There are two sorts of pervasive 
conflicts in securities fraud class actions that may threaten the 
"undivided loyalties to absent class members" that "basic due 
. " 132 p· h . 11 h fl . 1 process reqmres . 1rst, t ere 1s se er-purc aser con 1ct: c ass 
members all want to argue that the price was inflated when they 
purchased, but not when they sold. Because a class member will 
almost always have another class member as his counterparty in a 
129. !d. at 58-59. 
130. See, e.g., E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S . 395, 
403-04 (1977) (holding that plaintiff had not suffered employment discrimination) ; 
Franze v. Equitable Assurance, 296 F.3d 1250, 1251 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
plaintiffs claim was time-barred); McClain v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 105 F.3d 898, 903 
(4th Cir. 1997) (stating that plaintiff had not paid allegedly illegal loan insurance 
charges); Shapiro v. Midwest Rubber Reclaiming Co., 626 F.2d 63, 69 (8th Cir. 
1980) (discussing the fact that, in securities fraud case, plaintiffs did not rely on 
alleged misrepresentations); In re Am. Bank Note Holographies, Inc. Sec. Litig., 
93. F. Supp. 2d 424, 435 (S .D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that aftermarket purchasers could 
not represent Securities Act§ 12(a)(2) class). 
131. J.H. Cohn & Co. v. Am. Appraisal Assocs., Inc., 628 F.2d 994, 999 (7th 
Cir. 1980); see also Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(affmning denial of certification in securities case on typicality grounds because 
named plaintiff was subject to unique defenses); Gary Plastic Packaging Corp. v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(denying a motion for class certification because class representative subject to 
unique defenses); Warren v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 747 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that sophisticated investor not a suitable class representative as subject to 
peculiar defense); In re Razorfish, Inc. Sec. Litig., 143 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 
(S .D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that shareholder did not meet typicality requirement and 
was not "most adequate" plaintiff). 
132. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 338 (4th 
Cir. 1998). 
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trade of class securities, there is inevitable conflict as, in order to 
increase his own recovery, each class member will have an incentive 
to minimize the harm suffered by counterparty class members. 133 
The effect of such conflict can be quite substantial, and it increases 
as class periods lengthen; in its most extreme fom1, it will present the 
spectacle of a named plaintiff arguing that other class members are 
entitled to no recovery at all, something that should give any court 
pause. 134 Seller-purchaser conflict has prevented certification in 
some cases, 135 but it has yet to be given its full due. 
Second, there is arguably an "equity" conflict that occurs 
when some class members still hold stock. These members will 
want to reduce the recovery of other class members because recovery 
against the corporation reduces the value of their stock holdings. 136 
133. See, e.g., Robbins v. Koger Props., Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 
1997) (exemplifying the conflict between class members). 
134. See, e.g, In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 228 n.8 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(recognizing that proof that stock price was still inflated when class members sold 
stock shows those members "would have no damages"); Robbins v. Koger Props., 
Inc., 116 F.3d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that when a stock price is still 
inflated, plaintiffs have not suffered any damages). 
135. See, e.g., Ziemack v. Centel Corp., 163 F.R.D. 530, 540-542 (N.D. Ill. 
1995) (requiring plaintiffs to submit briefs on the issue of class representation due to 
conflicts in liability and damages); In re Sea gate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp. 
1341, 1359-62 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (fmding a class action unworkable because the 
reconciliation of conflicts would require too many class representatives); Ballan v. 
Upjohn Co., 159 F.R.D. 473,482-85 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (finding the plaintiff failed 
to meet the minimum standard of lack of antagonism between his interest and those 
of the class); Centurions v. Ferruzzi Trading Int'l, S.A., No. 89 C 7009, 1994 WL 
114860, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 7, 1993) (stating that plaintiffs did not show they were 
adequate representatives of proposed class as they were in conflicting positions in 
the market when they traded defendant's stock); Desimone v. Indus. Bio-Test Labs., 
Inc., 80 F.R.D. 112, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (denying class certification in part due to 
the possibility that the plaintiffs claims were antagonistic to those of other class 
members); Weisberg v. APL Corp., 76 F.R.D. 233, 239-40 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (stating 
that plaintiff could only represent stockholders who exchanged shares during certain 
time periods); Feldman v. Lifton, 64 F.R.D. 539, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (explaining 
that investors who purchased early in the ten-year period and those who bought later 
have interests that are antagonistic); Robinson v. Penn Cent. Co., 58 F.R.D. 436, 
443 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (stating that plaintiff may not adequately represent class 
because he seeks to represent all purchasers of common stock but may not have 
purchased from a named defendant). 
136. See In re Mut. Sav. Bank Sec. Litig., 166 F.R.D. 377, 383-85 (E.D. Mich 
1996) (discussing the conflict between "sellers" and "holders"). 
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Equity conflict has thus far not posed much of an obstacle to class 
. fi . 137 cert1 1cat10n. 
C. Predominance 
Plaintiffs seeking to establish materiality, reliance, loss 
causation, and fact of injury by common proof rely critically on the 
fraud-on-the-market theory. 138 They also rely on it reflexively, 
invoking the theory in some cases in which it is not applicable, and it 
is important to be ready to contest the assertion of a fraud on the 
market. One way to do this is by demonstrating that the market at 
issue is not efficient. 139 Another way is by demonstrating that the 
security' s price failed to react in a manner consistent with a fraud-
on-the-market case, either not rising on the misrepresentations or not 
falling on the subsequent disclosure of the truth. 140 Lack of 
appropriate price movement can preclude reliance on the fraud-on-
the-market theory, or simply reduce recovery to zero. 141 Without a 
fraud on the market, the individualized issue of reliance by itself is 
usually sufficient to defeat certification. 142 
137. Beyond the cases cited in note 135, supra, some of which also discuss 
equity conflict, perhaps the best treatment is Ruggiero v. Am. Bioculture, Inc., 56 
F.R.D. 93, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). 
138 . See, e.g., In re Honeywell Int'l. Inc ., Sec. Litig., Civ. No. 00-3605 
(DRD), 2002 WL 31525571, at *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2002) (discussing class 
certification and ability to take advantage of fraud-on-the-market theory). 
139. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1122 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(recognizing a market efficiency defense is available against a fraud-on-the-market 
claim), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Fryar v. Abell, 492 U.S . 914 (1989). 
More broadly, the efficient market hypothesis itself has come under fire recently as 
the growing school of"behaviorallaw and economics" seeks sacred cows to tip over. 
See generally Paul A. Ferrillo & Michael K. Rappaport, 'Sunbeam ' Warms Market 
Efficiency Arguments, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 24, 2001, at 8 (questioning the truth of the 
presumption that investors behave rationally). 
140. See, e.g., Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400, 414-15 (5th Cir. 
2001) (noting that the information in question did not affect stock price). 
141. See, e.g., id. at 414 ("It is clear that a fraud-on-the-market theory may not 
be the basis for recovery in respect to an alleged misrepresentation which does not 
affect the market price of the security in question."); Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. 
Ellis, 810 F.2d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 1987) ("If, for example, a firm reveals that an 
earlier public statement was mistaken, but the price of the securities does not move 
in response, the investors suffer no damages."). 
142. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Corp. , 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 
1996) ("[A] fraud class action cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an 
issue."). 
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It is also important to recognize the limitations of the fraud-
on-the-market theory. The theory essentially consoiidates the 
disparate plaintiffs into a single group-the market-and uses that 
measure of aggregate response as a substitute for individual proof. 143 
If the misrepresentations moved the market price up, they were 
material; if the subsequent disclosure of the truth moved the price 
down, plaintiffs were injured. 144 However, the commonality thus 
created exists for particular moments only, and the investors 
comprising the market are an ever-changing assemblage. Investors 
do not all buy and sell simultaneously, and the fraud-on-the-market 
theory does not create commonality between investors trading at 
different times. 145 An extended class period and the existence of 
multiple misrepresentations or corrective disclosures may prevent 
plaintiffs from establishing materiality or reliance by common proof 
even if they can use the fraud-on-the-market theory. 146 
Loss causation and fact of injury throw the theory ' s 
limitations into even sharper relief. Not only can plaintiffs who 
bought and sold at different times not rely on common proof to show 
that the market price was inflated as a result of defendant's 
misrepresentations when they purchased and not when they sold, but 
they also do not even have common aims. 147 Instead, the class 
members are pitted against other class members, each trying to 
establish contradictory theories about when inflation existed, when it 
dissipated, and what caused it. 148 Beyond the adequacy issues thus 
presented, this sort of individualized analysis can be tremendously 
complex. 
Nor does fraud-on-the-market necessarily even allow 
plaintiffs to establish reliance by common proof. Reliance, after all, 
143. See, e.g., In re Firstplus Fin. Group, Inc ., Sec. Litig., No. Civ.A.3:98-
CV-2551-M, 2002 WL 31415951, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Oct 28, 2002) (noting 
individual class members' reliance is not necessary). 
144. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1161 (3d Cir. 1986) (stating 
that where plaintiffs prove material misrepresentations and an open and developed 
market, the court will presume that misrepresentation increased the value and 
induced purchase). 
145. See, e.g., In re CINAR Corp. Sec. Litig. , 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 299 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002) (noting "the unavailability of the fraud-on-the-market theory to 
create commonality"). 
146. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 28. 
147. See, e.g., Seidman v. Am. Mobile Sys., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 354, 360 (E.D. 
Pa. 1994) (noting the questions for which plaintiffs could rely on common proof). 
148. See, e.g., id. 
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"is not enough by itself; that reliance must be justifiable, or 
reasonable." 149 Because reasonableness depends on the 
characteristics of an investor and the other information available to 
him, fraud-on-the-market may not even create commonality for 
plaintiffs purchasing at the same time. 15° Fraud-on-the-market, m 
short, is no panacea for the class action proponent. 
D. Superiority 
The superiority determination frequently comes down to the 
question of whether trial of the contemplated class action would be 
manageable. 151 Manageability, in tum, is in large part a function of 
two variables: the number of class members or transactions that must 
be examined and the complexity of the analysis that must be 
1-2 
performed for each. ) As classes grow larger, the number of 
required determinations can climb into the millions, and even routine 
inquiries can create insuperable manageability problems. If 
calculating a class member's damages requires fifteen minutes, for 
example (an optimistic estimate in most securities fraud cases, given 
the need to quantify inflation and show a causal link to the 
defendant's misrepresentations), and there are twenty million trades 
during the class period, a court working eight hours a day for five 
days a week will be done in slightly over 2,403 years. 
149. Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Harrison 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 77 F.3d 609, 618 (7th Cir. 1996)). 
150. In particular, sophisticated investors are held to higher standards with 
regard to reasonable reliance. See In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig., 151 F. 
Supp. 2d 371, 439 (S .D.N.Y. 2001). See generally Brown v. E.F. Hutton, 991 F.2d 
1020, 1032 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing reasonableness standards). A similar 
requirement has been imposed in some cases with respect to materiality. See Straub 
v. Yaisman & Co. , 540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976) (fmding no materiality 
when a plaintiff acting with "due care" should have known the relevant facts, taking 
into account plaintiffs "sophistication" and "access to relevant information") . 
151. "Contemplated" recognizes that the district court must consider the 
possibility, even if it is clear that certification will, as a practical matter, lead to 
settlement and not trial. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600 
(1997) (stating that "a class action may be certified for settlement purposes only, 
[but] Rule 23(a)'s requirements must be satisfied ... "); cf Kline v. Coldwell, 
Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 238 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., concurring) ("I 
doubt that plaintiffs' counsel expect the immense and unmanageable case that they 
seek to create to be tried. What they seek will become . .. an overwhelmingly costly 
and potent engine for the compulsion of settlements, whether just or unjust.") . 
152. See, e.g., Upshaw v. Ga. Catalog Sales, Inc ., 206 F.R.D . 694, 696 (M.D. 
Ga. 2002) (describing manageability and its interaction with superiority). 
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Recognizing the problems with multi-thousand-year 
proceedings, plaintiffs typically seek to simplify things by using two 
devices: bifurcating trials into liability and damages phases, 153 and 
using statistical methods to calculate damages. 154 The first can be 
opposed on the theory that liability and damages issues will overlap 
and bifurcation would amount to allowing one jury' s factual findings 
to be reexamined by another in violation of the Seventh 
Amendment. 155 In particular, since fact of injury is an element of the 
Rule 1 Ob-5 cause of action, a finding of liability implies a finding of 
mJury. 156 Allowing a second jury to determine the amount of 
damages raises the possibility that the amount could be zero, an 
obvious conflict. Additionally, unless some provision is made for a 
more efficient calculation of damages, bifurcation does not solve the 
problem of overwhelming the court's resources. 157 
Statistical calculation of damages is permissible in some 
circumstances, as when it is used to determine the appropriate 
awards to plaintiffs whose injuries have already been established. 158 
However, it cannot be used to eliminate the need to prove fact of 
injury on an individual basis, at least not where fact of injury is an 
element of the cause of action. 159 Consequently, plaintiffs will need 
153. See, e.g., In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 
141 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing bifurcation as a management tool for addressing 
damages in a class action). 
154. See, e.g., In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 137 F.R.D. 677, 
690 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (fmding class action manageable because of the use of 
statistical analysis to calculate damages for class members); Windham v. Amer. 
Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 68 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating that individual damage 
claims do not present a manageability problem if they are amenable to formula 
calculation) . 
155. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 423 n.21 (5th Cir. 
1998); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting 
mandamus petition seeking decertification in HIV /hemophiliac case based in part 
on concerns about the bifurcation plan adopted by the district court). 
156. See, e.g., Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 543 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (listing elements of cause of action under Rule 10(b)(5)), rev'd on other 
grounds, 459 U.S. 375 (1983). 
157. See Windham v. Am. Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 72 (4th Cir. 1977) 
("Whether dealt with in a unitary trial or in a severed trial, the problem of proof of 
the individual claims and of the essential elements of individual injury and damage 
will remain and severance could only postpone the difficulty of such proof."). 
158. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 
154, 188 (3d Cir. 2001 ). 
159. See, e.g., Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc ., 155 F.3d 331, 
343 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the average loss of individual plaintiffs was not 
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to prove non-zero damages without resorting to statistical methods, 
and the ability to employ statistics in a subsequent calculation m ay 
do little to alleviate manageability problems. 160 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rule 23(f) has ushered in a new era of appellate court 
involvement in certification decisions. The next few years will see 
rapid development of class certi fi cation law. The increased 
availability of appellate review gives defense counsel greater 
opportunity to oppose reflexive class certification in securities fraud 
cases, and this opportunity should be embraced. The cases are on the 
way; 407 federal securities fraud class actions have been fil ed so far 
this year, an all-time record and nearly double last year ' s total of 
216. 161 When the dust settles, it may tum out that certification of 
securities fraud class actions is no longer a foregone conclusion. 
sufficient to certify class and that the actual losses of individual plaintiffs, which 
varied substantially, must be determined); In re Fibreboard Co., 893 F.2d 706, 7 12 
(5th Cir. 1990) (denying certification of2990 asbestos plaintiffs where type of harm 
suffered varied substantially, making statistical calculation of the average damages 
suffered impermissible); Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1201-13 
(6th Cir. 1988) (holding that damages attributed to injuries unsupported by 
insufficient medical testimony needed to be recalculated); Windham v. Am. Brands, 
Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 70-72 (4th Cir. 1977) (denying class certification where, among 
other things , claims would require individual proof at trial); Kline v. Coldwell, 
Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1974) (establishing that proof of 
injury is an essential element of damages); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 
(9th Cir. 1974) (stating that it is improper to bypass individual damage calculations). 
160. In some cases, however, an inability to calculate damages mechanically 
will provide a sufficient ground to refuse certification. See, e. g., Windham, 565 F .2d 
at 68 ("[W]here the issue of damages and impact does not lend itself to . . . a 
mechanical calculation, but requires 'separate mini-trial[s]' of an overwhelming[ly] 
large number of individual claims, courts have found that the 'staggering problems 
of logistics' thus created 'make the damage aspect of [the] case predominate,' and 
render the case unmanageable as a class action."); Abrams v. Interco , Inc ., 719 F .2d 
23, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1983) (affirming denial of certification in antitrust case on 
manageability grounds because of the individualized nature of the necessary 
determinations regarding damages and other issues); Cont'l Orthopedic Appliances, 
Inc. v. Health Ins. Plan of Greater N.Y., Inc ., 198 F.R.D. 41, 47 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(denying certification in antitrust case in pmt because amount of damages w as not 
susceptible to common proof using a formula or economic model). 
161. See Jonathan D. Glater, Flood of Lawsuits Puts Underwriters in Cross 
Hairs, N.Y. TIM ES, Dec. 2, 2001, at BU4. 
